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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michelle Waters entered an Alford1 plea of guilty to second degree arson and
misdemeanor driving under the influence. She was sentenced to 15 years, with three
and one-half years fixed, upon her plea to second degree arson. At her sentencing, the
district court decreed that Ms. Waters was prohibited from having any contact with her
minor children for two years, and to thereafter only have contact in writing with her
children until they reached the age of 18. However, the district court never entered a
separate no contact order and, accordingly, never served a separate no contact order
on Ms. Waters. This no-contact provision was merely listed in a single paragraph in
Ms. Waters' judgment of conviction.
On appeal, Ms. Waters asserts that the no contact order entered by the district
court in this case fails to meet with almost every requirement contained within Idaho
Criminal Rule 46.2 and, therefore, a remand to the district court is required so that the
district court may enter a proper no contact order pursuant to I.C. § 18-920 and I.C.R.
46.2.
In addition, Ms. Waters asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied her Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion seeking a reduction of
her sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Michelle Waters was charged with first degree arson and misdemeanor driving
under the influence.

1

(R., pp.65-66.)

However, prior to her arraignment on these

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
1

charges, a criminal no contact order was entered against Ms. Waters pursuant to
I.C. § 18-920 that precluded Ms. Waters from having any contact with her four minor
children. (R., p.11.) Ms. Waters thereafter filed a motion to modify this no contact order
so as to allow her to have limited contact with her children.

(R., pp.56-57.) At her

arraignment, Ms. Waters asked the district court to modify the terms of her no contact
order to at least provide her with the ability to contact her four children either by phone
2

or through the mail. (10/26/10 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-12.) She noted that she had been the
primary care giver for her children for many years, and further asked the court to permit
some limited contact in order to assist them in dealing with the criminal process
Ms. Waters was facing. (10/26/10 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-12.) The State opposed this motion
and it was denied by the district court. (10/26/10Tr., p.13, L.16-p.15, L.14.) However,
the district court did inform Ms. Waters that the denial of the motion to modify the no
contact order was "without prejudice," and that she could renew her motion at a later
time. (10/26/10 Tr., p.15, Ls.13-19.)
About two months later, Ms. Waters again filed a motion seeking to modify the
criminal no contact order. (R., pp.84-87.) Appended to this motion was a letter written
by one of Ms. Waters' children, L.W., to a family law attorney in a then-pending custody
modification proceeding. (R., p.87.) In this letter, L.W. implored the attorney to permit
her to see her mother "as soon as possible" and informed this attorney at length as to all
of the reasons why L.W. needed to have contact with her mother.

(R., p.87.)

Ms. Waters subsequently filed an amended second motion seeking to modify the no
contact order that also appended another letter from one of her sons, P.W., that likewise

2

Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, for ease
of reference, citations made herein to the transcripts of proceedings are made in
accordance with the date of the proceeding transcribed.
2

asked the district court to permit Ms. Waters the ability to have some form of contact
with her children. (R., pp.91-94.) The district court denied this motion without prejudice.
(R., p.98.)
Ms. Waters ultimately entered an Alford plea of guilty to second degree arson
and misdemeanor driving under the influence.

(5/3/11 Tr., p.5, L.4 - p.20, L.16;

R., pp.149-155.) In exchange for her plea, the State also agreed to limit its sentencing
recommendation to 15 years, with five years fixed and to dismiss a felony charge in
another case.

(5/3/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.6-20.)

Ms. Waters retained the right to request a

lesser sentence. (5/3/11 Tr., p.6, L.14.)
The district court sentenced Ms. Waters to an aggregate sentence of 15 years,
with 3 and one-half years fixed, upon her plea of guilty to second degree arson, and to
180 days for her plea of guilty to misdemeanor driving under the influence. (6/20/11
Tr., p.72, Ls.2-16; R., pp.161-163.) At the sentencing hearing, the district court ordered
Ms. Waters to have no contact with her children for an absolute period of two years,
with the court permitting only written contact with her children for an unspecified period
of time following those two years. (6/20/11 Tr., p.73, L.7 - p.76, L.9.) When asked by
the bailiff whether Ms. Waters needed to sign the no contact order, the court merely
responded that, "Well, I've ordered the no contact order." (6/20/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.7-10.)
The district court never entered a separate no contact order pursuant to the
court's oral determination at sentencing that a new no contact order would be entered
against Ms. Waters.

Instead, the second "no contact order" in this case was merely

entered as a paragraph in Ms. Waters' judgment of conviction.

(R., p.163.)

provision provided - in its entirety - that:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall have no contact with
Dr. Waters or any of her children for an absolute period of two (2) years.
3

This

After June 20, 2013, the defendant may communicate with the protected
parties in writing.
(R., p.163.)
Based upon the vagueness of the court's order, Ms. Waters thereafter filed a
motion to clarify the no contact order.

(R., p.168.)

Specifically, Ms. Waters sought

clarification as to the date of termination of this order, since the district court stated both
that the no contact order had a specific date of termination and that Ms. Waters could
not have any contact other than in writing with her children after the termination of the
order. (R. p.168.) The district court initially held a hearing on this motion, but delayed
ruling on the motion because Ms. Waters' former husband could not be present and
wished to be heard on any request for modification. (8/2/11 Tr., p.79, L.4 - p.86, L.18.)
The court also suggested that the parties could submit any additional affidavits for the
court's consideration regarding the issue of whether the no contact order should be
modified.

(8/2/11 Tr., p.85, L.24 - p.86, L.18.)

However, the district court did

acknowledge that the terms of the no contact order did need to be clarified.

(8/2/11

Tr., p.86, Ls.15-18.)
After the hearing on this motion, Ms. Waters' counsel submitted an affidavit in
support of the request for clarification.

Within this affidavit, counsel requested the

district court also consider the prior period of one year that Ms. Waters was prohibited
from having contact with her children - pursuant to the earlier no contact order entered
at her arraignment - as part of the "cooling off" period that the court believed was
needed between Ms. Waters and her children; and to essentially reduce the term of
Ms. Waters' no contact order by one year.

(R., pp.187-189.)

Ms. Waters, through

counsel's affidavit, made additional alternative requests for modification of the no
contact order.

First, she asked the district court to modify the order so that it would

4

terminate completely as of her oldest child's 18th birthday on October 2, 2011.
(R., p.188.)

Second, Ms. Waters asked that the order terminate in its entirety by

August 12, 2012 - which would provide a satisfactory cooling off period. (R., p.188.) If
the district court was unwilling to modify the order in the manner suggested, Ms. Waters
further asked that the provisions of the no contact order extending past the two year
fixed period be limited to only the time during which each of her children were minors,
and that it terminate with regard to each of her children upon them reaching the age of
18. (R.,p.188.)
In addition to requesting clarification and modification of the no contact order
entered by the district court at sentencing, Ms. Waters also filed a timely Rule 35 motion
requesting a reduction of her sentence. (Motion to Reduce Sentence, Augment. 3 ) In
this motion, Ms. Waters pointed out to the district court that, due to prison overcrowding,
she had not been placed in any substance abuse or mental health treatment programs,
and would not be placed in any such programs until approximately 2013. (Motion to
Reduce Sentence, Augment.) She further corrected a misapprehension of the court at
sentencing regarding whether Ms. Waters had previously had the opportunity to receive
treatment for her prior substance abuse problems. While the court expressed its belief
at her sentencing hearing that Ms. Waters had received such treatment in the past,
Ms. Waters clarified that the only program she had participated in was one that provided
monitoring for nurses in recovery - this program did not provide any direct counseling or
treatment.

(Motion to Reduce Sentence, Augment.)

3

Ms. Waters further provided

Ms. Waters' motion asking for a reduction of her sentence, along with several other
documents in this case, were augmented into the record pursuant to Ms. Waters' motion
to augment the record, which was granted by the Idaho Supreme Court on March 29,
2012. For ease of reference, citations to those documents incorporated into the record
pursuant to this order are made in accordance with the document title.
5

additional documentation on the Program for Recovering Nurses, as well as a letter of
support that was submitted by her father.

(Motion to Reduce Sentence, Augment.)

Finally, Ms. Waters noted that she had been a "model prisoner" during her
incarceration. (Motion to Reduce Sentence, Augment.)
Thereafter, the district court entered an order clarifying the no contact order and
denying Ms. Waters' Rule 35 motion. (Order Clarifying No Contact Order and Denying
Motion for Sentence Reduction, Augment) The district court initially found, within this
order, that the no contact order issued by the court at sentencing, "was vague and
subject to interpretation and requires clarification." {Order Clarifying No Contact Order
and Denying Motion for Sentence Reduction, Augment.)
In clarifying the no contact order, the court indicated that its intent was that
Ms. Waters be prohibited from contacting her children for two years from the date of
sentencing.

(Order Clarifying No Contact Order and Denying Motion for Sentence

Reduction, Augment.) However, in light of the fact that Ms. Waters had already been
prohibited from contacting her children under the prior no contact order, the district court
modified the present no contact order so that it would prohibit contact, "for a two (2)
year period commencing August 6, 2010 and expiring August 6, 2012."

(Order

Clarifying No Contact Order and Denying Motion for Sentence Reduction, Augment.)
Following this period, the district court indicated, Ms. Waters was free to contact her
children once they reached the age of 18, but that she could only contact her children
who were still minors in writing. (Order Clarifying No Contact Order and Denying Motion
for Sentence Reduction, Augment.) The district court further vested Ms. Waters' exhusband with the power to permit additional contacts either in person or by telephone

6

between Ms. Waters and her minor children following August 6, 2012. (Order Clarifying
No Contact Order and Denying Motion for Sentence Reduction, Augment.)
Regarding Ms. Waters' request for leniency at sentencing, the district court
denied that motion.

(Order Clarifying No Contact Order and Denying Motion for

Sentence Reduction, Augment.) In doing so, the court found that the sentence, "was
appropriate at the time it was imposed," and that, "the Court is not convinced that
circumstances have changed or that the Court improperly imposed the sentence."
(Order Clarifying No Contact Order and Denying Motion for Sentence Reduction,
Augment.)
Subsequent to this order, the eldest of Ms. Waters' children, M.W., filed his own
motion to modify the second no contact order entered against Ms. Waters so that he
could have contact with his mother. (Request to Modify No Contact Order, Augment.)
M.W. noted in this motion that he was over 18 years old.

(Request to Modify No

Contact Order, Augment.) The court initially held a hearing on this motion, but delayed
ruling on the motion due to the fact that Ms. Waters' ex-husband had requested to be
present but was unavailable to attend that hearing. (2/21 /12 Tr., p.16, L.14 - p.27, L.8.)
However, the district court did advise M.W. that, even if the court did grant his motion,
the no contact order entered at Ms. Waters' sentencing would preclude M.W. from
indirectly communicating any messages between Ms. Waters and her other children despite the fact that there was nothing in the district court's order at sentencing that
addressed indirect communications. (2/21/12 Tr., p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.24.)
At the second hearing on M.W.'s motion to modify, the district court again heard
from M.W. regarding his request to be able to have contact with his mother. (3/1/12
Tr., p.28, L.14 - p.46, L.9.)

The court additionally heard from Ms. Waters' former
7

husband, who opposed any modification of the no contact order. (3/1/12 Tr., p.42, L.3 p.43, L.3.) The district court ultimately granted M.W.'s request to modify the no contact
order so that he would be allowed to have contact with Ms. Waters. (3/1/12 Tr., p.44,
L.19 - p.46, L.9; Order Modifying No Contact Order, Augment.) However, as before,
the district court repeatedly warned M.W. that he would not be allowed to pass any
messages from Ms. Waters to her remaining children even with the court's modification.
(3/1/12 Tr., p.35, L.24-p.36, L.16, p.40, L.16- p.41, L.17.)
Ms. Waters timely appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence
entered in her case. (R., p.174.)

8

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court enter an invalid criminal no contact order against
Ms. Waters, and further err by failing to correct the infirmities within this order
upon being presented with Ms. Waters' motion seeking clarification and
modifications of this order?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Waters' Rule 35
motion seeking a reduction of her sentence?

9

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Entered An Invalid Criminal No Contact Order Against
Ms. Waters, And Further Erred By Failing To Correct The Infirmities Within This Order
Upon Being Presented With Ms. Waters' Motion Seeking Clarification And Modifications
Of This Order

A.

Introduction
The no contact order entered by the district court in this case at Ms. Waters'

sentencing, and subsequently modified by the court thereafter, fails to meet with nearly
every requirement for a valid no contact order as set for in I.C.R. 46.2.

Despite the

court being put on notice as to the vagueness of this order, the district court did not
correct its failure to enter a valid no contact order, but merely amended the terms of the
original no contact order in subsequent orders that likewise failed to meet the
requirements of I.C.R. 46.2. Because these requirements are mandatory, and because
the order entered by the district court at Ms. Waters' sentencing is too vague to be
enforceable, Ms. Waters asks this Court to vacate the no contact order entered by the
district court at her sentencing.

B.

Standard Of Review
Questions regarding the proper interpretation of statutes and court rules are

questions of law that this Court reviews de nova. See, e.g. State v. Castro, 145 Idaho
173, 175 (2008).

10

C.

The District Court Erred When It Entered An Invalid Criminal No Contact Order
Against Ms. Waters. And Further Erred By Failing To Correct The Infirmities
Within This Order Upon Being Presented With Ms. Waters' Motion Seeking
Clarification And Modifications Of This Order
The no contact order entered by the district court at Ms. Waters' sentencing

failed to comply with nearly all of the mandatory requirements for such orders contained
within I.C.R. 46.2. Despite being put on notice that the court's order

consisting solely

1

of a single paragraph contained within Ms. Waters judgment of conviction - had
problems with vagueness, the district court failed to correct the deficiencies in its order
despite also modifying the no contact order on several occasions. Because this order
subjected Ms. Waters to separate criminal liability for any violation of its terms, and
because the district court's no contact order was so deficient as to provide virtually no
notice as to the essential terms of this order, Ms. Waters asserts that this order should
be vacated.
In 1997, the Idaho legislature enacted I.C. § 18-920, which authorized a trial
court to enter a no contact order against a defendant upon being charged with any of a
number of enumerated offenses, or for any offense for which the court found such an
order to be appropriate. See S.L. 1997, ch.314 § 1; State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71,
74-75 (2002).

This statute was subsequently amended so as to permit a no contact

order to be issued by the trial court in conjunction with a defendant's conviction as well.

Jeppesen, 138 Idaho at 75.
Subsequently, in 2002, the Idaho Supreme Court promulgated I.C.R. 46.2 in
order to govern the issuance of criminal no contact orders pursuant to I.C. § 18-920.

State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175 (2008). This rule provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) No contact orders issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-920 shall be in
writing and served on or signed by the defendant. Each judicial district
shall adopt by administrative order a form for no contact orders for that
11

district. No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the
following information:
(. 1')

The case number, defendant's name and victim's name;

(2)

A distance restriction;

(3)

That the order will expire at 11 :59 p.m. on a specific date, or
upon dismissal of the case;

(4)

An advisory that:
(a)

A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a
separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail
will be set until an appearance before a judge, and
the possible penalties for this crime,

(b)

The no contact order can only be modified by a judge,
and

(c)

When more than one domestic violence protection
order is in place, the most restrictive provision will
control any conflicting terms of any other civil or
criminal protection order.

I.C. § 18-920(a) (emphasis added).
Virtually none of the advisories that are mandated for a valid no contact order
under I.C.R. 46.2 are found in the no contact order that was entered by the district court
at Ms. Waters' sentencing. This order was set forth in its entirety within Ms. Waters'
judgment of conviction and sentence as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall have no contact with
Dr. Waters or any of her children for an absolute period of two (2) years.
After June 20, 2013, the defendant may communicate with the protected
parties in writing.
(R., p.163.)

12

This order was not on a separate form that had been promulgated for Ada
County, despite the fact that such forms are available. 4 See I.C.R. 46.2(a). Although
this order states that it applies to Ms. Waters' children, none of them are named (by
either full name or by initials) within the order.

See I.C.R. 46.2(a)(1).

The order

contains no distance restriction whatsoever. See I.C.R. 46.2(a)(2). As originally written,
the order purported to contain both a date of termination - June 20, 2013 - and a
provision that extended the term indefinitely. See I.C.R. 46.2(a)(3). However, even as
amended, the district court's order clarifying the no contact order extends the term of
the order to "when the children reach the age of eighteen." (Order Clarifying No Contact
Order and Denying Motion for Sentence Reduction, Augment.) There is no advisory in
this order at all regarding any of the potential criminal penalties that may be imposed as a separate criminal offense - for a violation of this order; that the order could only be
modified by a judge; or that, if another no contact order or domestic violence protection
order is in place, that the more restrictive provisions would control what contacts are
permitted. See I.C.R. 46.2(a)(4).
Each of the required provisions and advisories for a valid no contact order under
I.C.R. 46.2(a) are either deficient, or entirely absent from, the no contact order in this
case. These requirements are not merely procedural formalities that have little bearing
on the overall validity of a criminal no contact order.

The required information to be

contained within these orders are essential in order to comport with due process
requirements as to notice to those impacted by such a no contact order.

4

It is apparent that these forms are available for Ada County because a magistrate had
entered a prior no contact order against Ms. Waters in t~1is case using such forms.
(R., p.11.)
13

Due process requires that the charged individual have prior notice of the nocontact order before criminal liability can be imposed on the basis of an alleged violation
of that order's terms. "It is well established that a conviction under a criminal enactment
which does not give adequate notice that the conduct charged is prohibited is violative
of due process." Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963). In fact, even when the
regulation at issue is a prison rule, as opposed to a criminal statute, due process
requires fair notice that the conduct at issue is prohibited before a sanction can be
imposed. See, e.g., Nelson v. Hayden, 138 Idaho 619,622 (Ct. App. 2003).
Regarding penal laws of general applicability, satisfying the notice requirement
demanded by due process is fairly straightforward - the statute itself that defines a
criminal offense is generally deemed to put the public on notice as to what conduct may
or may not subject them to criminal punishment. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho
874, 880 (Ct. App. 2000).

As was noted by the Wilson Court, "it is axiomatic that

citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge of the law once such laws are
passed." Id.
But no-contact orders that are entered solely against a particular individual are
different. Unlike criminal statutes, which define criminal offenses generally and apply to
all those subject to the laws of Idaho, criminal no-contact orders are issued solely
against one individual and are frequently directed at contacts that would be entirely
legal in absence of the individualized order. See I.C. § 18-920. In addition, no person
may be arrested for the offense of violation of a no-contact order without a warrant
unless there is probable cause to believe both that the person has violated the nocontact order and that the person had prior notice of the order. I.C. § 18-920(4).

14

Accordingly, the mandatory requirements

forth in I.

1n all criminal no contact orders, are not mere
prerequisites to the validity of a no contact

R. 46.2(a), which are
of formality - they are

In this case, none of those

are met with regard to the court's no contact order.

The absence of clear

provisions as to what conduct is forbidden under the no contact order in this case, and
when criminal liability may result as a violation of this order, can be seen in the district
repeated interactions with Ms. Waters' eldest child as to potential violations
.,c.i,,c.u

on indirect or third-party contacts, despite the absence of any language within the

no contact order that addressed this type of contact

During the two hearings on M.W.'s motion to modify the no contact order, the
district court made repeated remarks indicating the court's belief that Ms. Waters would
in violation of the no contact order entered against her at sentencing if

asked

M.W. to convey a message indirectly to any of her other children still subject to the no
contact order. (2/21/12 Tr., p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.24; 3/1/12 Tr., p.35, L.24 - p.36, L.16
p.40, L.16 - p.41, L.17 .) However, a prohibition against indirect or third party contacts
is not reflected in the no contact order that was entered against Ms. Waters within her
judgment of conviction.

(R., p.163.)

Had the district court actually used the model

forms provided by Ada County for no contact orders, as is required under I.C.R. 46.2(a),
this information would have been conveyed clearly as a term of the no contact order, as
these forms contain an advisory that the term "contact" would include contacts, "in
person or through another person." (R., p.11.)
Additionally, it is entirely unclear whether Ms. Waters would be in violation of this
order if she were to attend any of her children's school functions without attempting to
directly convey any communications to her children given that there is no recitation of
15

whether there is any distance restriction as part of this order. Similarly, those charged
with enforcing this order would not have clear guidance as to whether Ms. Waters
attending any of her children's school functions would be a violation.
Moreover, even after the district court was put on notice that the no contact order
was vague, the court's purported correction to the lack of a date of termination did not
comply with the requirements of I.C.R. 46.2.

Although the court entered an order

clarifying the no contact order, the amendments made by the district court did not cure
the order's infirmity regarding a definite date of termination.

This clarification and

amendment provided that the no contact order would expire on August 6, 2012 - but
then went on to state that Ms. Waters was only permitted to have contact in writing with
her children until the child reached the age of 18. (Order Clarifying No Contact Order
and Denying Motion for Sentence Reduction, Augment.) This is not the type of definite
date of termination contemplated or required by I.C.R. 46.2(a)(3), as those charged with
enforcing this order would have no way to determine on the face of the order when the
order would lapse with each of the individual children.
Among the reasons why the Idaho Supreme Court modified I.C.R. 46.2 to require
a definite date of termination was that, in absence of such a date, there was a
significant risk of, "confusion, false arrests, and lawsuits," resulting from the inability to
determine whether a no contact order without a termination date was still in effect.
Castro, 145 Idaho at 175-176.

Although there will come a date when each of

Ms. Waters' children will turn 18, the dates for each of her children are not set forth in
the no contact order, which creates the same risk of confusion and false arrests for
those charged with enforcing this order as is present for those orders with no stated
date of termination.
16

In sum, the district court's no contact order in this case fails to meet with virtually
every mandatory requirement for criminal no contact orders set forth in I.C.R. 46.2(a).
However, this Court treats the provisions of a sentence relating to criminal no contact
orders as severable from the remaining sentence.

See Jeppesen, 138 Idaho at 75.

Accordingly, where the no contact order is invalid, this Court will vacate the no contact
order as a severable provision from the underlying judgment of conviction and
sentence. Id.

Ms. Waters therefore asks that this Court vacate the no contact order

entered by the district court at Ms. Waters' sentencing and remand this case for further
proceedings.
II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Waters' Rule 35 Motion
Seeking A Reduction Of Her Sentence
Ms. Waters asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of her sentence.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record,
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giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Waters does not allege that
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, Ms. Waters must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria, or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
As a preliminary matter, Ms. Waters provided the district court with new and
additional information that was not available to the court at the time of her sentencing.
First, Ms. Waters informed the district court that, due to prison overcrowding,
Ms. Waters had not been placed in any mental health or substance abuse treatment
programs, and that she would not be eligible for such programs until approximately
2013. (Motion to Reduce Sentence, Augment.) Second, Ms. Waters corrected a factual
misapprehension at sentencing regarding her prior participation in the Program for
Recovering

Nurses.

Namely,

she informed the court that, contrary to prior

representations at sentencing, she never actually received any drug or mental health
counseling through this program.

(Motion to Reduce Sentence, Augment.)

Third,

Ms. Waters informed the district court that she had been a model prisoner during the
course of her incarceration, demonstrating "herself to be reliable, obedient, and
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amenable to structure." (Motion to Reduce Sentence, Augment.) Finally, she produced
an additional letter of support from her father. (Motion to Reduce Sentence, Augment.)
This new information regarding the exact nature of the Program for Recovering
Nurses is important because it corrected a factual misapprehension regarding
Ms. Waters' past opportunities for substance abuse treatment and therapeutic
resources. At sentencing, the State made repeated remarks regarding Ms. Waters' past
opportunities for "attempted rehab and programming and things," in an effort to convey
to the court that Ms. Waters had previously been given treatment resources for
substance abuse and had nevertheless relapsed.
Ls.16-23, p.28, Ls.10-20.)

(6/20/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.1-6, p.27,

This argument was directed towards a minimization of

Ms. Waters' potential for rehabilitation in light of the State's apparent belief that the
Program for Recovering Nurses included some form of treatment or therapeutic
component.
As was clarified by Ms. Waters in her Rule 35 motion, the Program for
Recovering Nurses does not actually provide any mental health or substance abuse
counseling or treatment.

(Motion to Reduce Sentence, Augment.)

Rather, "this

program monitors impaired nurses suffering from chemical abuse or dependency," and
does not provide any "direct counseling, treatment, or aftercare services." (Motion to
Reduce Sentence, Defendant's Exhibit A, Augment.)

This information is particularly

relevant to the district court's sentencing determination in light of the fact that
Ms. Waters presentence investigation report recommended that she receive a rider in
part so that Ms. Waters would be eligible to receive the therapeutic resources provided
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through the retained jurisdiction

program.

(Presentence

Investigation

Report

(hereinafter, PSI), p.38.) 5

Additionally, a review of the entire record in this case demonstrates that
Ms. Waters' sentence of 15 years, with three and one-half years, was excessive.
Ms. Waters has demonstrable and significant rehabilitative potential.

Ms. Waters

obtained masters degree in Fine Arts and Medical Illustrations, and subsequently
returned to school to obtain her nursing degree.

(PSI, p.28.) Ms. Waters has been

gainfully employed for most of her adult life prior to her arrest and conviction in this
case.

(PSI, p.28.)

Given her skills and education, there is every probability that

Ms. Waters will be able to re-enter society as a positive and contributing member to her
community.
More importantly, Ms. Waters clearly recognized the harm caused by her actions,
accepted responsibility for her own behavior, and is clearly committed to taking
whatever steps are necessary in the future to ensure that she never repeats her past
mistakes. At her sentencing hearing, Ms. Waters expressed sincere remorse for the
pain her actions caused - most especially to her friends, her family, and her children.
(6/20/11 Tr., p.60, L.21 - p.61, L.1.) Ms. Waters accepted responsibility for being the
agent of that harm and apologized to the court and her loved ones for her actions.
(6/20/11 Tr., p.61, Ls.6-18.)
Not only did Ms. Waters express remorse and accept responsibility for her past
actions, she expressed her firm commitment to changing her future course of behavior
to make sure that she would never repeat the past patterns of thinking and action that

5

For ease of reference, citations to the pages contained within the presentence
investigation report are made in accordance with the numbering reflected in the
electronic formatting of this document.
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caused her offense. (6/20/11 Tr., p.61, L.19 - p.64, L.15.) She had already begun this
process at the time of her sentence - Ms. Waters had attended all of the therapeutic
and religious programs that were made available to her as of the time of her sentencing.
(6/20/11 Tr., p.63, Ls.6-11.)

Certificates showing her completion of these programs

were also provided to the district court at sentencing. (PSI, pp.227-229.)
Additionally, Ms. Waters' criminal actions in this case are partly attributable to her
underlying mental health conditions.

Ms. Waters has been diagnosed with major,

recurrent depression. (PSI, p.4.) She had been in counseling for her depression since
2001, although her struggles with depression appear to be on-going. (PSI, pp.30-31,
182-189, 199-200.)

Her mental condition is further exacerbated by her history of

substance addiction. (PSI, p.200.) Her mental health evaluation also noted that, at the
time of the alleged arson, Ms. Waters was taking medications that could have impacted
her reasoning faculties caused impairment to her overall memory and cognition and,
therefore, likely contributed to her underlying offense. (PSI, pp.201-202.) This report
concluded that Ms. Waters was a low risk to reoffend given appropriate treatment and
supervision upon her release. (PSI, p.203.)
Moreover, a review of Ms. Waters criminal history reveals that her present
offenses - along with the offense that was dismissed as part of her plea agreement are her only criminal offenses outside of one traffic offense several years prior. (PSI,
p.7.) As was noted within Ms. Waters' mental health evaluation, she also has no history
of setting fires, which renders her present offense a, "unique and somewhat aberrant
event." (PSI, p.203.)
Finally, Ms. Waters has a very significant support network among her friends and
family. Many of these people wrote letters of support for Ms. Waters at sentencing that
21

attested to her good character.

(PSI, pp.230-261.)

Given what appears to be

unwavering support from a host of friends, family, and former colleagues, Ms. Waters
will re-enter the community with the assistance of a broad network of people who will be
of great assistance to her rehabilitation.
In light of the new and additional information provided by Ms. Waters through her
Rule 35 motion, as well as the entire record in this case, Ms. Waters' sentence of 15
years, with three and one-half years fixed, for second degree arson was well beyond
that required to adequately protect society and to serve the related goals of
rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence.

Accordingly, Ms. Waters submits that the

district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 35 motion seeking a
reduction of her sentence.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Waters respectfully requests that this Court vacate the no contact order
entered against her. Additionally, she asks that this Court reverse the district court's
order denying her Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of her sentence, and remand this
case for further proceedings.

In the alternative, she asks that this Court reduce her

sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 15th day of June, 2012.

SARAH E~ TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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